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This paper o⁄ers empirical evidence that a country￿ s choice of exchange rate
regime can have a signi￿cant impact on its medium-term rate of productivity
growth. Moreover, the impact depends critically on the country￿ s level of
￿nancial development, its degree of market regulation, and its distance from
the global technology frontier. We illustrate how each of these channels
may operate in a simple stylized growth model in which real exchange rate
uncertainty exacerbates the negative investment e⁄ects of domestic credit
market constraints. The empirical analysis is based on an 83 country data
set spanning the years 1960-2000. Our approach delivers results that are
in striking contrast to the vast existing empirical exchange rate literature,
which largely ￿nds the e⁄ects of exchange rate volatility on real activity to
be relatively small and insigni￿cant.1 Introduction
Throughout the developing world, the choice of exchange rate regime stands
as perhaps the most contentious aspect of macroeconomic policy; witness the
intense international debate over China￿ s exchange rate system. On the one
hand, the conventional wisdom in international economic policy circles is that
￿ exible exchange rates are the best option for most countries, outside those
contemplating joining a larger economic and currency union. Most develop-
ing countries, particularly commodity price exporters, face massive terms of
trade shocks, and arguably need a ￿ exible exchange rate as a shock absorber.
Moreover, it appears that one of the biggest mistakes made by many Asian
countries prior to the region￿ s late 1990s ￿nancial crisis, was to try to liberal-
ize ￿nancial markets without simultaneously making the exchange rate more
￿ exible.
Flexibility may be the new conventional wisdom in international eco-
nomic policy circles, but relatively ￿xed exchange rate regimes remain quite
popular ￿and surprisingly durable ￿throughout the developing world, most
famously in Asia, but also in many poorer developing countries.1 Policy-
makers have in many cases, strongly resisted outside pressure to make rates
more ￿ exible. Who is right? The canonical theoretical literature on choice
of exchange rate regime (see the discussion in Obstfeld and Rogo⁄, 1996, or
Garber and Svensson, 1995) would seem to broadly support the case of more
￿ exibility, given the pervasive volatility facing many of these economies. That
is especially the case today, when in￿ ation has broadly subsided throughout
the developing world, and the case for needing a hard currency peg as an
anti-in￿ ation anchor is far weaker than it seemed twenty years ago.
Yet, whereas the conventional theoretical literature points towards
allowing more exchange rate ￿ exibility in many developing countries, the em-
pirical evidence is far from decisive. Indeed, since the classic paper of Baxter
and Stockman (1989), researchers have had a di¢ cult time demonstrating
that a countries choice of exchange rate regime has any systematic e⁄ect on
macroeconomic performance, for variables ranging for consumption and out-
put volatility to the level or real interest rates. There is some evidence of an
e⁄ect of exchange rate volatility on trade levels (Frankel and Wei, 1993 and
1Calvo and Reinhart (2002) have famously labeled many countries reluctance to allow
their exchange rates to ￿ oat as ￿fear of ￿ oating.￿See Rogo⁄ et. al. (2004) for evidence
on the surprising durability of ￿xed or pegged exchange rate regimes in poorer developing
countries that have little de facto international capital market integration.
1Rose, 2000). The e⁄ect, however, does not appear to be large and it is even
less clear that the resulting trade expansion has any great impact on welfare
(see Krugman, 1987)).2
In this paper, we argue that the main e⁄ect of exchange volatility may
be on medium-term productivity growth, especially in countries with poorly
developed ￿nancial markets. Moreover, this e⁄ect is likely to be magni￿ed
the farther behind a country is technologically relative to the frontier. Our
theoretical analysis builds on the closed economy model of Aghion-Angeletos-
Banerjee-Manova (2005).3 We develop a simple stylized model that shows
how exchange rate volatility can cause a higher percentage of ￿rms in the
economy to run into credit constraints. These constraints, in turn, imply
a lower economy-wide average level of investment, and lower growth. The
idea that exchange rate volatility can be a major source of macroeconomic
volatility in many countries is supported by table 1; the table illustrates
just how volatile exchange rates can be compared to most other sources of
macroeconomic disturbances.
The empirical part of the paper develops a cross-country analysis
where we look at data across 83 countries over the years 1960-2000. When a
2Husain, Mody and Rogo⁄ (2005) do ￿nd that developing countries with more ￿ exible
exchange rates have historically tended to have lower in￿ ation rates, though they do not
￿nd any signi￿cant di⁄erence in growth rates. They argue informally that ￿xed rates may
be more important for countries with more fragile political and ￿nancial institutions, but
they do not provide any direct evidence for this view. For emerging markets, they ￿nd no
signi￿cant di⁄erent in growth or in￿ ation across exchange rate regimes.
3Aghion-Angeletos-Banerjee-Manova argue that volatility can a⁄ect productivity
growth in the presence of credit constrained ￿rms. The basic explanation put forward
by AABM, can be summarized as follows. Suppose that producers can decide whether to
invest in short-run capital or in a long-term productivity enhancing venture. Typically, the
long-term productivity-enhancing investment creates a need for liquidity in order to face
medium term idiosyncratic liquidity shocks. With perfect credit markets the necessary
liquidity is always supplied, but this is no longer the case when credit markets are imper-
fect. The liquidity shock is only ￿nanced when the ￿rm has enough pro￿ts, because only
pro￿table ￿rms can borrow enough to cover their liquidity costs. A negative aggregate
shock, by making all ￿rms less pro￿table, makes it less likely that the liquidity need of
any of them will be met. As a result, a fraction of the potentially productivity-enhancing
long-term investments will go to waste, with obvious consequences for growth. A main
implication is that ￿rms in countries with better ￿nancial markets will deal better with
volatility, and therefore will tend to go more for long-term investments, which in turn
should generate higher aggregate growth. We note that Baldwin (1992), in his analysis
of European Monetary Union, noted that a single currency might have growth e⁄ects on
Europe by reducing the exchange rate premium on capital within Europe.
2country￿ s de facto degree of exchange rate ￿ exibility (measured in a variety
of ways, including the one suggested by Reinhart and Rogo⁄, 2003) is inter-
acted with its level of ￿nancial development (as measured by private credit to
GDP), the results prove both robust and highly signi￿cant. Whereas a high
degree of exchange rate volatility actually leads to faster productivity growth
in advancing countries, it leads a lower growth in countries with relatively
thin ￿nancial markets. Moreover, these e⁄ects are not only statistically sig-
ni￿cant, they appear quantitatively signi￿cant as well. For example, consider
the case of Chile, whose level of ￿nancial depth ranges from 10% in 1975 to
70% in 2000. Our point estimates for our baselines regression suggest that
this dramatic increase in ￿nancial development has reduced the e⁄ect of ex-
change rate volatility on Chile￿ s growth by a factor of ￿ve. Our core results
appears to hold intact against a variety of standard robustness tests, includ-
ing attempts to quarantine the results against outliers and regional e⁄ects
and allowing for alternative control variables. We also consider alternative
measures of exchanger rate volatility, as well as considering distance to the
technological frontier and degree of market regulation as both alternative,
and supplementary, interaction variables.
Overall, our results point towards an important exception to the
standard exchange rate ￿disconnect￿puzzle (Obstfeld and Rogo⁄, 2001), as
well as suggesting new directions for research on the choice of exchange rate
regime. We present our simple stylized model in the ￿rst section after the
introduction, and our empirical results come after that. The data are detailed
in an appendix, which also includes further robustness tests.
2 The model
In this section, we try to develop the simplest model possible to analyze
the e⁄ect of exchange rate ￿ exibility on productivity growth. We consider a
small open economy with overlapping generations of entrepreneurs and work-
ers. We assume that nominal wages are rigid and that the central bank either
￿xes the nominal exchange rate or follows an interest rate rule. Productivity
grows as a result of innovation, where innovation occurs to each entrepre-
neur with su¢ cient funds at the end of the ￿rst period of her life. The model
focuses on the interaction of nominal exchange rate ￿ uctuations and produc-
tivity growth. We ￿rst describe the production environment and derive the
expression for equilibrium pro￿ts in function of the exchange rate. We then
3analyze how ￿rms innovate under credit constraints. Next, we introduce the
central bank and the nominal exchange rate behavior. Finally, we state our
main predictions on the interplay between growth, credit constraints, and
the choice of exchange rate regime, which we put to test in the next section.
In our analysis, we compare the impact of di⁄erent regimes on produc-
tivity growth, but do not examine the factors that lead a country to choose
one or the other regime. In practice, economic ideology, history, political
considerations and many other "exogenous" factors almost surely play a role
in the choice of exchange rate regime. Such an analysis, while fascinating,
goes behind the scope of this paper.
2.1 The environment: agents, ￿rms, and equilibrium
pro￿ts
Consider a small open economy producing a single good identical to the world
good. At each period, a new continuum of two-period lived individuals is
born. One half of the individuals is selected to become entrepreneurs, while
the other half become workers. Individuals are risk-neutral and consume
their accumulated income at the end of their life.
During the ￿rst period of their life, entrepreneurs can produce using a
technology with current average productivity, namely:
yt = At (lt)
￿ ;
where At denotes the country￿ s current productivity level at date t; ￿ < 1;
and lt denotes the ￿rm￿ s labor input at date t. At the end of the ￿rst period,
entrepreneurs can invest in innovation and thereby realize extra rents in their
second period. We shall describe the innovation technology below. But ￿rst
we derive the equilibrium labor demand and equilibrium ￿rst period pro￿t
of an entrepreneur born at date t:
Since ￿rms in the small domestic economy are price-takers, they take the
foreign price of the good, P ￿
t , as given. Assuming purchasing power parity
(PPP), converted back in units of the domestic currency, the value of one




where Pt is the domestic price level and St is the nominal exchange rate
4(number of units of the domestic currency per unit of the foreign currency).4
We will assume that P ￿
t is constant and normalize it to 1.5 Thus, Pt = St.
In a ￿xed exchange rate regime, St is constant, whereas under a ￿ exible
exchange rate regime St is random and ￿ uctuates around its mean value
E(St) ￿ S. The reason why ￿ uctuations in the nominal exchange rate St
will lead to ￿ uctuations in ￿rms￿real wealth, and consequently on innovation
and growth, is that nominal wages are rigid and preset before the realization
of St. This in turn exposes ￿rms to an exchange rate risk as the value of
sales will vary according to St whereas the wage bill will not.6
For simplicity, we take the wage rate at date t to be determined such
that the real wage at the beginning of that period is equal to some reser-
vation value; kAt; where k < 1 refers to the workers￿productivity-adjusted




where Wt is the nominal wage rate preset at the beginning of period t and
E(Pt) is the expected price level. Using the fact that E(Pt) = E(St) = S;
we immediately get
Wt = kSAt:












4It is analogous to assume that exporting domestic ￿rms do ￿ local currency pricing￿ . In
a model with monopolistic competition and preset prices, exporting ￿rms would also have
the option to set the price in their own currency (producer currency pricing). Note that
in this case, exporting ￿rms will still be sensitive to nominal exchange rate ￿ uctuations
as foreign demand ￿ uctuates and a strong exchange rate appreciation tends to squeeze
pro￿ts. However, Bacchetta and van Wincoop (2005a) show that ￿rms prefer to price the
export good in the importer￿ s currency when their country represents a small market share
from the point of view of the importer.
5Implicitly we are assuming that the foreign country strictly targets the price level.
6In this benchmark model, the interesting measure of the real exchange rate is based
on labor costs. The real rate based on price levels becomes of interest once we introduce
non-traded goods or distribution services.
5and
￿t =  At (St)
￿
1￿￿ ; (2)
where   ￿ (1 ￿ ￿)(￿=kS)
￿
1￿￿: We thus see that equilibrium pro￿ts are in-
creasing in the nominal exchange rate St:
2.2 Innovation and credit constraints
We assume that in any ￿rm i the entrepreneur can upgrade her technology
up to the current (foreign) technology frontier A￿
t in the second period of
her life, if she is able to pay an innovation cost Ci
t that occurs at the end
of her ￿rst period. Because innovation allows her to catch up with current
frontier productivity, it is natural to assume that the cost of innovation itself
depends upon foreign productivity A￿
t:7 We assume the following linear form







where ci is independently and identically distributed across ￿rms in the do-
mestic economy, and for simplicity we take its log to be uniformly distributed
over some interval [f ￿ ￿;f]: The parameter f < 0 determines the average
level of the innovation cost. While all ￿rms face the same probability distri-
bution over ci ex ante, ex post the realization of ci di⁄ers across ￿rms. We
assume that the net productivity gain from innovating is su¢ ciently high
that it is always pro￿table for any entrepreneur to try and innovate.
In order to pay for her innovation cost, the entrepreneur can borrow on
the local credit market. However, credit constraints will prevent her from
borrowing more than a ￿nite multiple ￿￿t of her current pro￿ts. We take ￿
as the measure of ￿nancial development and assume it constant.8
Thus, the funds available for innovative investment at the end of the ￿rst
period are at most equal to (1 + ￿)￿t and therefore the entrepreneur will
7A similar assumption is made by Acemoglu-Aghion-Zilibotti (2005) and Aghion-
Howitt-Mayer (2005).
8If ￿ was endogenous, it would decrease with more volatile pro￿ts, thus reinforcing
the negative impact of exchange rate volatility. However, we do not consider this e⁄ect
explicitly.
6innovate whenever:9
(1 + ￿)￿t ￿ C
i
t






(1 + ￿) at
where at ￿ At=A￿
t represents the country￿ s productivity relative to the world
technology frontier, and therefore measures the country￿ s proximity to that
frontier. By taking logs:
st ￿ e ￿ln
ci
(1 + ￿) at
(3)
where st = lnSt and e ￿ ￿ 1￿￿
2￿￿1 (e ￿ > 0, since empirically ￿ > 0:5).10
In particular, an entrepreneur is more likely to innovate when the ex-
change rate is depreciated, with a large level of ￿nancial development, and
with a greater proximity to the technology frontier. We now turn to the
determination of the exchange rate.
2.3 Shocks and exchange rate behavior
Firms are a⁄ected by real and ￿nancial shocks. First, there are productivity
shocks. More speci￿cally, we assume that domestic productivity relative to
the foreign frontier is random and can be expressed as:
at = e ate
ut; (4)
where e at is the deterministic part of at and ut is a productivity shock with
E(ut) = 0 and variance ￿2
u:
Second, there are shocks to the foreign exchange market. Arbitrage be-
tween domestic and foreign bonds by foreign investors give the following
interest parity condition (expressed in logs):
st = s
e
t+1 + ln(1 + i
￿) ￿ ln(1 + it) + ￿t (5)
9The exent of borrowing and the interest rate charged obvsiously a⁄ect entrepreneurs￿
consumption, but has no impact on growth in this model. It would be interesting to extend
the model to analyze the impact of debt and its currency composition, e.g., as in Aghion,
Bacchetta, and Banerjee (2004).
10The reason why we need ￿ > 0:5 is that the innovation cost is also sensitive to
the exchange rate, so that both this cost and ￿rms pro￿ts decline in case of currency
appreciation.
7where it and i￿ represent domestic and foreign nominal interest rates (on
one-period bonds). The foreign interest rate is taken as given and assumed
constant throughout the analysis.11 The variable ￿t represents a time-varying
risk premium determined by investors in the foreign exchange market. Risk-
premium shocks are introduced to model the ￿ disconnect￿between nominal
exchange rate variations and other fundamental variables.12 The variance of
the risk premium is ￿2
￿ and we assume that E(￿t) = 0.
For notational simplicity, we assume that when the exchange rate regime
is ￿xed, it is set at st = 0. When the exchange rate regime is ￿ exible,
the central bank follows an interest rate (or Taylor) rule and the exchange
rate is determined by the market. In order to stabilize pro￿ts, the central
bank reacts to exchange rate shocks (equivalent to price level shocks) and to
productivity shocks.13 The rule takes the form:
ln(1 + it) = ￿0 + ￿1 ￿ st + ￿2 ￿ ut (6)
where we will assume that ￿0 = ln(1 + i￿). For the moment we take ￿1
and ￿2 as given, but we examine below the case where they are determined
optimally by the central bank.
By substituting this rule back into (5), integrating forward and ruling



















ut ￿ e ￿ln
ci
(1 + ￿) e at
(8)
11A constant foreign interest rate can be justi￿ed if we assume a technology with constant
real return r￿. Since there is no in￿ ation in the foreign country we have i￿ = r￿.
12Risk-premium shocks come from the behavior of investors who trade for reasons other
than the rationally expected return. For example, Jeanne and Rose (2002) and Devereux
and Engel (2003) assume that some traders have biased expectations; Duarte and Stock-
man (2005) assume shocks to perceived covariances; and Bacchetta and van Wincoop
(2005b) assume hedging trade. The latter show that when investors have heterogenous
information, small shocks to hedging trade have a large impact on the exchange rate.
13See Woodford (2003) for a discussion of interest rate rules and Kollman (2002) and
Obstfeld (2004) for an application in an open-economy context. Kollman also introduces
risk premium shocks to generate more realistic exchange rate volatility.
82.4 Productivity growth and the main theoretical pre-
diction
Productivity growth depends on the proportion of ￿rms that satisfy the inno-
vation condition (8). If we let this proportion be ￿t, the level of productivity
at time t is given by:14
At = ￿tA
￿
t + (1 ￿ ￿t)At￿1 (9)
Dividing through by A￿
t, and if we assume that foreign productivity A￿
t grows








How do we determine ￿t? Consider ￿rst the case where the domestic
economy has chosen a ￿ exible exchange rate regime. Since the innovation
costs ci are identically and independently distributed across ￿rms, by the
law of large numbers the proportion of innovating ￿rms ￿t is simply equal to










ut￿1 ￿ e ￿ln
ci
(1 + ￿) e at￿1
): (11)
Thus, if we let




















if e ￿t ￿ 1
if 0 < e ￿t < 1
if e ￿t ￿ 0
: (12)
We will assume that volatility can never help growth through some kind of
a ￿ gambling for resurrection￿e⁄ect (see AABM). More precisely, we assume
that with no volatility (i.e., ￿t￿1 = ut￿1 = 0) e ￿t ￿ 1, that is:
Assumption A1:
ln((1 + ￿) at￿1) ￿ f ￿ 0:
14The technology level is determined by the extent of innovations of ￿rms in their second
period, while new ￿rms take the level of technology as given.
9(remember that f < 0).
Since empirical evidence shows that exchange rate shocks are much larger
than other shocks, we now focus on the case where ￿2
u = 0. Figure 1 illustrates
how the probability ￿t depends on the exchange rate (or risk premium) shock
in (12). First, consider the solid line. The innovation probability ￿t declines
for negative values of ￿t, that is, with the occurrence of a domestic currency
appreciation. It is easy to see that a larger variance ￿2
￿ reduces ￿t, and
therefore growth. However, the broken line shows that growth declines less
with ￿2
￿ the higher ￿nancial development ￿ or technological development at
and lower the average innovation cost as parametrized by f:
FIGURE 1 HERE
While these comparative statics results hold in general, it will be con-
venient to develop our analysis in the special case where the exchange rate




In this case, the variance of the exchange rate shock is simply equal to ￿2
￿ =
("￿)2. Moreover, if we assume that "￿ is such that for all t; 0 < e ￿t+1 < 1















e ￿(1 + ￿1)
+ ln((1 + ￿) at) ￿ f]g (13)
whenever this expression is positive.
Notice that for su¢ ciently large levels of ￿nancial and technological de-
velopment (that is, when ￿ and at are large enough), we have
E(￿t+1) = 1:
However, when ￿ and at are not too large, (13) holds and expected growth
decreases with exchange rate volatility measured by "￿.
10If we now consider the case where the domestic economy has chosen a ￿xed
exchange rate regime, Assumption A1 implies that the expected growth rate









Proposition 1 Suppose that ￿t = 1 when ￿2
￿ = 0. Then, moving from a
￿xed to a ￿exible exchange rate will reduce average growth all the more: i)
with a lower level of ￿nancial development as measured by ￿; ii) in a country
where productivity lies further below the world frontier productivity:
Remark 1: Convergence: Combining the above analysis with that in
Aghion-Howitt-Mayer (2005), we conjecture that the lower the degree of
￿nancial development in a country, the more likely it is that higher exchange
volatility will prevent the country from converging to the world technological
frontier in growth rates and/or in per capita GDP levels.
Remark 2: Market Regulation: Suppose that innovation costs re￿ ect
market ￿ exibility, with more ￿ exible product and/or labor markets implying
a lower innovation costs as they allow ￿rms to re-orient production across
markets more easily. Then, the innovation cost parameter f will re￿ ect the
degree of product or labor market rigidity or regulation. Obviously, the
innovation probability ￿t decreases with f: In particular, the higher f; the
more an increase in exchange rate volatility will reduce growth (starting from
no volatility) and the more detrimental to growth it will be to move from a
￿xed to a ￿ exible exchange rate regime.
Remark 3: Endogenous interest rate rule: Assume that the government
chooses the optimal ￿1, but faces a cost to adjust interest rates (so that ￿1 is
￿nite). The government will then be more ￿ aggressive￿with larger volatility.
In other words, the optimal ￿1 increases with ￿2
￿, as shown in the Appendix.
It is easy to see from (12) and Figure 1 that an increase in ￿1 tends to dampen
the e⁄ect of increased volatility on expected growth, but that the conclusions
in Proposition 1 remains valid.
2.5 On the stabilizing role of ￿ exible exchange rates
Proposition 1 was established for the case without productivity shocks. How-
ever, it is often argued that a ￿ exible exchange rate regime may be desirable
11because it allows a country to stabilize the e⁄ect of real shocks.15 The in-
teresting question, then, is whether a ￿xed exchange rate still dominates a
￿ exible exchange rate once we introduce productivity shocks on top of ex-
change rate shocks. The answer turns out to be positive insofar as ￿2
u is not
too large compared to ￿2
￿.
To see this, consider the simple case of two-point distributions for both









u) < 1;e ￿t+1(￿"
￿;￿"
u) < 1:
Now, under the assumption that ￿t = 1 in the absence of volatility, we can
compare expected growth rates respectively under ￿ exible and ￿xed exchange
rate regimes using an equation analogous to (13). We ￿nd that a ￿ exible
exchange rate regime yields a higher growth rate whenever:
"u
"￿ > (e ￿ ￿ 1)(1 + ￿1) + ￿2: (14)
This inequality has interesting implications. First, in most countries the
parameter e ￿ (￿ 1￿￿
2￿￿1) is close to 1 and ￿2 is less than one, so that we essen-
tially need ￿2
u > ￿2
￿ for exchange rate ￿ exibility to be growth-enhancing. Sec-
ond, to the extent that ￿nancial (and also technological) development a⁄ect
the optimal Taylor rule (￿1;￿2); they interact with the relative variance "u="￿
in determining which exchange rate regime dominates. More speci￿cally, the
Appendix examines the case where ￿1 and ￿2 are determined optimally by
the central bank. In particular, it is shown that ￿1 and ￿2 decrease with ￿
and at. Thus, (14) is more likely to hold when ￿ and at are large. In other
words, a ￿ exible exchange rate is more likely to foster growth in countries at
higher level of ￿nancial development and technology.
15Broda (2004) and Edwards and Levy-Yeyati (2003) show empirically that ￿ exible
exchange rates dampen the impact of terms-of-trade shocks on output or growth. We will
show that this ￿nding also holds in our data sample.
16It is straightforward to extend the analysis to the case where e ￿t(￿"￿;"u) ￿ 1 and/or
e ￿t("￿;￿"u) ￿ 1.
123 Empirical Results
The theoretical analysis showed that exchange rate volatility can reduce pro-
ductivity growth for countries with a low level of ￿nancial development, far
from the technology frontier, and with a higher degree of market regulation.
In this section we test these predictions in a dynamic panel of 89 countries
over the 1960-2000 period. We consider three measures related to exchange
rate ￿ exibility: i) the exchange rate regime based on the natural classi￿cation
of Reinhart and Rogo⁄ (2004), henceforth RR; ii) the standard deviation of
the real e⁄ective exchange rate; iii) the degree of "overvaluation". The latter
measure is suggested by our theoretical analysis: with rigid wages, only real
appreciations reduce pro￿ts.17 We ￿rst present the methodology and the
variables used and then examine each prediction in turn. We ￿nd that they
are con￿rmed by the data.
3.1 Data and Methodology
As is now standard in the literature, we construct a panel data set by trans-
forming our time series data into ￿ve-year averages. This ￿lters out business
cycle ￿ uctuations, so we can focus on long run growth e⁄ects. Our depen-
dent variable is productivity growth, rather than total growth. We use the
GMM dynamic panel data estimator developed in Arellano and Bond (1991),
Arellano and Bover (1995) and Blundell and Bond (1997) and we compute
robust two-step standard errors by following the methodology proposed by
Windmeijer (2004).18 This approach addresses the issues of joint endogeneity
of all explanatory variables in a dynamic formulation and of potential biases
induced by country speci￿c e⁄ects. The panel of country and time-period ob-
servations is unbalanced. Appendix C presents the lists of country included
17This prediction comes from the simple speci￿cation of our model. There may be other
channels at work. For example, in the context of ￿nancial crises, it is an undervaluation
that may lead to a squeeze in pro￿ts and a decline in output (e.g., see Aghion, Bacchetta,
and Banerjee, 2004). Whether an overvaluation has a negative impact is an empirical
question that we examine in this section.
18It has been recognized that the two steps standard errors are downward biased in a
small sample and the Windmeijer (2004) method corrects for that. Notice that, as the
two-step estimator is asymptotically e¢ cient, this approach is superior to just relying on
￿rst step estimates and standard errors as is common in the empirical growth literature
that uses small samples. See Bond (2002) for a simple description of the methodology we
follow.
13in the sample.
Our benchmark speci￿cation follows Levine, Loayza and Beck (2000) who
provide evidence of a growth enhancing e⁄ect of ￿nancial development; they
were the ￿rst to use the system GMM estimation we are using. We consider
productivity growth instead of total growth, but our regressions are estimated
with the same set of control variables.19 Starting from this benchmark, we
examine the direct e⁄ect on growth of our exchange rate ￿ exibility measures.
Then, we look at the interaction between these measures and the level of
￿nancial development, the distance to the technology frontier, and various
measures of regulation. More speci￿cally, we estimate the following equation:
yi;t￿yi;t￿1 = (￿ ￿ 1)yi;t￿1+￿1ERi;t+￿2ERi;t￿Ii;t+￿Ii;t+￿
0Zi;t+￿t+￿i+"i;t
(15)
where yi;t is the logarithm of output per worker; ERi;t is either the degree
of ￿ exibility of the exchange rate regime, real exchange rate volatility, or
a measure of overvaluation; Ii;t is the dimension of interaction (￿nancial
development, distance to frontier or market regulation); Zit is a set of other
control variables, ￿t is the time-speci￿c e⁄ect, ￿i is the country-speci￿c e⁄ect,
and "i;t is the error term.
We use three measures for the variable ERi;t. First, we compute an index
of ￿ exibility of the exchange rate regime in each ￿ve-year period based on
the RR exchange rate classi￿cation. Ignoring the free falling category, the
RR annual natural broad classi￿cation orders regimes from the most rigid
to the most ￿ exible: ERRt 2 f1;2;3;4g = ffix;peg;managed float;floatg.








The second measure we consider for ERi;t is the ￿ve-year standard devia-
tion of annual log di⁄erences in the e⁄ective real exchange rate. We construct
19See their table 5, page 55. The other di⁄erences with Levine et al. (2000) are that
we use a larger data set, we use the Windmejer standard errors, and we include a banking
crisis dummy. Loayza and Ranciere (2005) show that their results stay unchanged when
the original panel is extended to 83 countries over 1960-2000 and when a banking crisis
dummy is introduced. Levine et al. (2000) show similar results when the same equation
is estimated in cross-section with legal origin as external instrument.
20The information on the ￿ exibility of exchange rate is reported for each country-5 years
interval during which the RR classi￿cation indicates a non free falling regime for at least
3 out of 5 years.
14the e⁄ective rate as a trade-weighted index of multilateral real rates as ex-
plained in Appendix A. The third measure is the ￿ve-year average deviation
from a predicted level of the real e⁄ective exchange rate.21
For the interaction variable Ii;t we ￿rst consider ￿nancial development
measured as in Levine, Loayza and Beck (2000) by the aggregate private
credit provided by banks and other ￿nancial institutions as a share of GDP.
Second, we use the distance to the world technology frontier measured by
initial labor productivity in each ￿ve-year period. Third, we consider a set of
indicators of market regulations constructed by Loayza, Oviedo and Serven
(2004). In the latter case, we only have cross-country averages.
The dependent variable is growth in real GDP per worker. Our set of
control variables includes average years of secondary schooling as a proxy for
human capital, in￿ ation and the size of the government (government expen-
diture as proportion of GDP) to control for macroeconomic stability, and an
adjusted measure of trade openness.22 A dummy indicating the frequency of
a banking or a currency crisis within each ￿ve years interval is introduced in
the robustness checks. This indicator controls for rare but severe episodes
of aggregate instability likely to be associated with large changes in the
variables of interest.23. De￿nition and sources for all variables are given in
Appendix B.
The introduction of an interaction term Ii;t allows to identify non linear
e⁄ects of the degree of ￿ exibility of the exchange rate on productivity growth.
Furthermore when ￿1 and ￿2 have opposite signs, a threshold e⁄ect arises:
￿(yi;t ￿ yi;t￿1)
￿ERi;t
= ￿1 + ￿2Ii;t > 0 , Ii;t > e I := ￿
￿1
￿2
In tables 3 to 5, we report threshold levels of ￿nancial development and tech-
nological development above which a more ￿ exible exchange rate becomes
21More precisely, we compute the average log di⁄erence between the actual exchange
rate and the exchange rate predicted by country and time speci￿cic characteristics (income
per capita, population densisty, regional and time dummies) as in Dollar (199*). We also
consider average log di⁄erences from a HP detrended multilateral exchange rate series as
in Goldfajn and Valdes (1999), and ￿nd similar results.
22precisely: the residuals of a pooled regression of (imports + exports)/GDP over struc-
tural determinants of trades such as landlock situation, an oil producers dummy, and
population.
23For instance, Loayza and Hnakovska (2003) present evidence hat crisis volatility can
explain for an important part the negative relashionship between volatility and growth
oberved in middle-income economies.
15growth enhancing. The standard errors of the respective threshold levels are
computed using a delta method, that is by taking a ￿rst order Taylor approx-
imation around the mean. Notice that in small sample, the delta method is
known to result in excessively large standard errors24.
3.2 Estimation Results: Exchange Rate Flexibility and
Financial Development
Tables 2, 3 and 4 present the estimations of the impact of the exchange
rate regime, exchange rate volatility and real overvaluation on productivity
growth. Each table displays the results of four regressions. The ￿rst regres-
sion estimates the e⁄ects of the exchange rate measure along with ￿nancial
development and a set of control variables, without interaction term. The
second regression adds a variable interacting the exchange rate measure and
the measure of ￿nancial development in order to test our main prediction:
the presence of a non-linear e⁄ect of exchange rate volatility in the level of
￿nancial development. The third and fourth regressions replicate the same
regressions with the addition of a dummy variable indicating the frequency
of a currency or banking crisis in the ￿ve-year interval.
In Table 2, regression [2.1] illustrates the absence of a linear e⁄ect of the
exchange rate regime on productivity growth. This result is consistent with
many previous studies. In contrast, regression [2.2] shows that the interac-
tion term of exchange rate ￿ exibility and ￿nancial development is positive
and signi￿cant. The more ￿nancially developed an economy, the higher is
the point estimate of the impact of exchange rate ￿ exibility on productivity
growth. Furthermore, the combined interacted and non-interacted coe¢ -
cient of ￿ exibility becomes signi￿cant at the 5% level (as indicated by the
Wald Test in Table 2). Combining these two terms enables us to identify a
threshold of ￿nancial development below (above) which a more rigid (￿ exi-
ble) regime fosters productivity growth. The point estimate of the threshold
is close to the sample mean of the ￿nancial development measure. In regres-
sions [2.3] and [2.4], we introduce the crisis dummy described above. While
the frequency of crisis has indeed a negative impact on productivity growth,
the non-linear e⁄ect of exchange rate regime on growth remains robust and
its point estimate stays almost unchanged.
24An more accurate procedure would be to derive standard errors on thresholds using a
bootstrap method.
16The main result of Table 2 is that letting the degree of exchange rate
￿ exibility vary with the level of ￿nancial development allows us to identify
signi￿cant growth e⁄ects of the exchange rate regime.25 The implication is
that less ￿nancially developed economies may derive growth bene￿ts from
maintaining a rigid exchange rate regime. This result provides a novel ra-
tional interpretation for the "fear of ￿ oating" behavior based on long run
productivity growth.
Table 3 presents similar results with exchange rate volatility measured by
the ￿ve-year volatility of the change in multilateral real exchange rates. Re-
gression [3.1] indicates that exchange rate volatility has a signi￿cant negative
impact on productivity growth. This e⁄ect is economically important: an
increase of 50 percent in exchange rate volatility - which corresponds to the
mean di⁄erence in volatility between a ￿xed and a ￿ exible exchange rate (see
Table 1) - leads to a 0.33 percent reduction in annual productivity growth.
This e⁄ect is only marginally reduced when we control for the impact of
a crisis as in regression [3.3]. Regression [3.2] shows that the interaction
between exchange rate volatility and ￿nancial development is positive and
signi￿cant: the more ￿nancially developed an economy is, the less adversely
is it a⁄ected by exchange rate volatility. Here again, the economic impact is
important. For instance, consider Chile, whose level of ￿nancial depth ranges
from 10% in 1975 to 70% in 2000. This drastic change decreases the negative
impact of exchange rate volatility on growth by a factor of ￿ve. Moreover,
our estimate indicates that exchange rate volatility exhibits no signi￿cant
impact on productivity growth for the set of the most ￿nancially developed
economies.26
Table 4 presents regressions that focus on the e⁄ect of real exchange
overvaluation. Here, we test the implication of our model that exchange rate
￿ uctuations resulting in overvaluations will dampen productivity growth by
reducing ￿rms￿pro￿ts and by increasing their exposure to liquidity risk. We
present the results using the deviation between the actual e⁄ective real ex-
change rate and its predicted value.27 In the baseline regression [4.1], real
overvaluation has a signi￿cant and economically important negative e⁄ect on
growth: a 20% overvaluation translates into a reduction of 0.2% in annual
25We also considered alternative classi￿cations ...
26These are countries with a private credit to GDP ratio in the range of [90%,120%]. This
includes the euro aera, the U.K., Switzerland, Finland, Sweden, the US, and Australia.
27We obtain similar results when we consider HP deviation from trend when - as in
Golfajn and Valdes - the HP ￿lter parameter is set high enough (lamba=108)
17productivity growth (computed from regression [3.1] as 0.99*ln(120/100)).
Regression [4.2] studies the e⁄ect of interacting real overvaluation and ￿nan-
cial development and shows that the more ￿nancially developed an economy
is, the less vulnerable it becomes to real overvaluations. Using the previous
example, a change in ￿nancial depth comparable to the one experienced by
Chile over 1975-2000 results in a reduction by two of the negative e⁄ect of
real overvaluation on productivity growth.
The set of regressions presented in Tables 2, 3 and 4, o⁄ers robust evidence
that the level of ￿nancial development plays an important role in mitigating
the negative e⁄ects of exchange rate volatility on productivity growth. They
rationalize the observation that countries with a low or intermediate level of
￿nancial development manage their exchange rate and monetary policies in
order to reduce real exchange rate ￿ uctuations. These results stay unchanged
when the e⁄ects of crises are accounted for. It is also reassuring that control
variables in the regression have the expected e⁄ects: education and trade
openness have a positive and signi￿cant impact on growth while the e⁄ect of
in￿ ation and government burden is negative although not always statistically
signi￿cant..
The estimation procedure is valid only under the assumption of weak
exogeneity of the explanatory variables. That is, they are assumed to be
uncorrelated with future realizations of the error term. The consistency of
the GMM estimators depends on whether lagged values of the explanatory
variables are valid instruments in the growth regression. We address this
issue by considering two speci￿cation tests suggested by Arellano and Bond
(1991) and Arellano and Bover (1995). The ￿rst is a Sargan test of over-
identifying restrictions, which tests the overall validity of the instruments.
Failure to reject the null hypothesis gives support to the model. The second
test examines whether the di⁄erenced error term is second-order serially cor-
related. In all regressions, we can safely reject second order serial correlation
and the non-validity of our instruments.
3.3 Estimation Results: Exchange Rate Flexibility and
Distance to the Productivity Frontier
In this section, we test the prediction that the e⁄ect of exchange rate ￿ exi-
bility on growth depends on the level of technological development measured
by labor productivity. The empirical strategy is similar to the one previously
18followed to assess the role of ￿nancial development. The impact of exchange
rate volatility and of labor productivity are ￿rst analyzed in a linear set-up
before being interacted in order to uncover any non-linear e⁄ects. Formally,
the distance to the technology frontier can be expressed as:
di;t = ln(yi;t=li;t) ￿ ln(yus;t=lu;t)
where yi;t and li;t are respectively the initial level of output and the labor
force at the inception of each ￿ve year period. As our regressions include a
common time e⁄ect, we can simply ignore the term ln(yus;t=lu;t) and measure
the distance to the frontier with the absolute level of labor productivity,
ln(yi;t=li;t).
As we are using the same baseline speci￿cation, the regressions without
interacted terms are identical to the ones presented in columns 1 and 3 of
Tables 2, 3, and 4. Notice that in the pure linear speci￿cation, the coe¢ cient
on initial output per worker, i.e. the convergence term, is negative but not
signi￿cant except in the regression using real exchange rate volatility. Table 5
presents the results of regressions performed using the ￿ exibility of exchange
rate regime, real exchange rate volatility and real overvaluation.
Regression [5.1] shows that the interaction between labor productivity
and the exchange rate regime has a positive and signi￿cant impact on growth.
The interpretation is that the higher the level of productivity, the better (or
the less detrimental) is the impact of a more ￿ exible exchange rate regime
on productivity growth. We can identify a threshold level of output per
worker above (below) which a more ￿ exible (rigid) regime fosters productivity
growth. The point estimate of this threshold is US$ 5000 (constant 1995
US$), which is close to the actual productivity levels of present day Thailand
and Peru and to the levels of Korea and Chile in the seventies.
Regressions [5.2] and [5.3] reveal a similar non-linear e⁄ect when ex-
change rate volatility and real overvaluation are considered. A higher ini-
tial level of productivity dampens the negative impact of exchange rate
volatility or overvaluation on productivity growth. A threshold analysis sug-
gests that, in economies close enough to the technological frontier [i.e. with
yi;t=li;t > $30000; the level of Spain in 1985], exchange rate volatility or real
overvaluation does not impact the productivity growth process.
3.4 Estimation Results: Exchange Rate Flexibility and
19Term of Trade Growth
In the theory, we showed that a ￿ exible exchange rate regime can stabilize the
e⁄ects of real shocks, but still have a negative impact on growth. In order to
test this hypothesis in our sample and to contrast it with our prior ￿ndings,
we analyze here the e⁄ect of change in the terms of trade on productivity
growth. Broda (2004) and Edwards and Levy-Yeyati (2003) have con￿rmed
empirically that ￿ exible exchange rate regimes tend to absorb the e⁄ects of
term of trade shocks. In the baseline regression [6.1], a 10% deterioration
in terms of trade leads to a reduction of 0.8% in productivity growth. In
regression [6.2], we ￿nd that the impact on productivity growth of a term
of trade shock depends crucially on the nature of the exchange rate regime.
It is maximal under a ￿x exchange rate regime and close to zero under a
￿ oating regime. In regression [6.3], we show that this stabilization e⁄ect of
a more ￿ exible regime fully coexists with the growth enhancing e⁄ect of a
more ￿xed regime in less ￿nancially developed economies.
3.5 Estimation Results: Exchange Rate Flexibility and
Market Regulations
In section 2.4, we propose an alternative interpretation of our model in terms
of market regulations. The bottom line is that a highly regulated economy
may ￿nd itself ill-suited to face large real exchange rate shocks. For example,
a high degree of product regulation, e.g. the need for licenses to produce and
trade some goods, can prevent ￿rms to respond to large exchange rate shocks
by investing in the production of new goods or by shifting production between
home and foreign markets. Regulation of entry can have similar e⁄ects.
Another example is the regulation on closure: the absence of bankruptcy
protection can force ￿rms into lengthy and costly liquidation procedures and
prevent a more productive use of their assets.
We use the regulation indices constructed by Loayza, Oviedo and Serven
(2004) from various sources including the "Doing Business Survey" (The
WorldBank Group). Here we consider 4 indices: labor regulation, product
regulation, regulation of entry and bankruptcy regulation (or regulation of
closure). We also include an overall index of regulation. Regulation indices
are normalized between zero and one with a higher value standing for higher
levels of regulation.
20An important caveat is that, in contrast to the other variables, the regu-
lation indices are constructed from various surveys performed in the nineties
and do not exhibit time variation. Therefore, we can identify and test the
e⁄ect of the interaction between regulation indices and the ￿ exibility of the
exchange rate but not their individual e⁄ect on productivity growth. More
precisely, the regulation index, along with any ￿xed e⁄ect, drops out when
equations are taken in di⁄erences.28 The number of observations is also
smaller
Our model predicts a negative interaction between the indices of regula-
tion for entry, closure and product and the degree of ￿ exibility of the exchange
rate regime. That is, highly regulated economies may su⁄er more severely
from exchange rate volatility and could therefore bene￿t from a more rigid
exchange rate regime. The prediction on labor regulation is more ambiguous
because labor market regulation, usually associated with more rigid nominal
wages, can also be an amplifying source of exchange rate shocks. The results
presented in Table 7, provide encouraging support to our model￿ s predic-
tions: the interaction between the degree of ￿ exibility of the exchange rate
regime is in all cases negative. It is signi￿cant, at the 5% level, in the case
of production and closure but not in the case of entry or labor.29
4 Conclusion
The vast empirical literature following Baxter-Stockman (1989) and Flood-
Rose (1994) generally ￿nds no detectable di⁄erence in macroeconomic per-
formance across ￿xed versus ￿ oating exchange rate regimes. In this paper,
we argue that instead of just looking at macroeconomic volatility, it is also
important to look for the e⁄ects of the exchange rate regime on growth. We
develop a theoretical model in which higher levels of exchange rate volatil-
ity can stunt growth, especially in countries with thin capital markets. We
o⁄er what seems to be fairly robust evidence suggesting the importance of
the ￿nancial development for how the choice of exchange rate regime a⁄ects
28A separate coe¢ cient for each regulation index could in principle be estimated only
from the level equation. We nevertheless choose not to include it in order to keep only
variables that enters both in the level and di⁄erence equations of the system estimated by
GMM.
29a natural robustness check would be to add to these regressions the in-
teraction between ￿nancial development and ￿ exibility of the exchange rate
regime analysed in Table 3.
21growth.30 Indeed, at this point, the main quali￿cation to our results would
seem to be the standard question of endogeneity. Whereas it is indeed di¢ -
cult to ￿nd satisfactory instruments, we note that we obtain similar results
for various measures of exchange rate volatility, as well as when we look at
measures of distance from frontier and degree of market regulation in place
of the level of ￿nancial development. Also, by excluding high in￿ ation ￿freely
falling￿exchange rate regimes in our baseline regressions, we are hopefully
eliminating the most egregious cases where weak institutions would simul-
taneously explain low productivity growth and the choice of exchange rate
regime (generally ￿ exible because high in￿ ation makes a sustained ￿x impos-
sible.)
Are our result necessarily at odds with the prescriptions of the standard
exchange rate models? Not necessarily. The classical literature holds that the
greater the volatility of real shocks relative to ￿nancial shocks a country faces,
the more ￿ exibility is should allow in its exchange rate. Our analysis shows
that this prescription has to be modi￿ed to allow for the fact that ￿nancial
market shocks are ampli￿ed in developing countries with thin and poorly
developed credit markets. In particular, countries should adopt more ￿ exible
exchange rates the greater the e⁄ective volatility of real shocks relative to the
e⁄ective volatility of ￿nancial market shocks. Clearly, more fully articulated
structural models are needed to properly measure the tradeo⁄s, and this
would appear to be an important challenge for future research.
30Rogo⁄ et. al (2004) and Husain, Mody and Rogo⁄ (2005) do ￿nd di⁄erences in
exchange rate regime performance across developing countries, emerging markets and ad-
vanced economies. However, perhaps because they do not incorporate any structural vari-
ables in their regressions such a private credit to GDP, or distance to frontier, they only
found signi￿cant and robust e⁄ects of exchange rate regime choice on growth in advanced
economies.
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26A Endogenous Interest Rate Rule
A.1 Risk-premium shocks
First assume ￿2
u = 0. Consider the interest rate rule that maximizes growth
in period t minus a convex cost of interest rate deviation from its steady-state
value.31 Suppose that deviating from the long-run steady-state interest rate
i￿ entails a convex cost












In the special case where the cost C is quadratic with
C(x) = ￿x
2;
the ￿rst order condition for this maximization program is expressed as:
2￿￿2
￿








































for su¢ ciently low ￿; otherwise this derivative is equal to zero. In particular,
we see that endogeneizing ￿1 tends to dampen the e⁄ect of increased volatility
on expected growth, as it allows the government or central bank to adjust
the interest rate and therefore the exchange rate so as to partly o⁄set the
negative e⁄ect of the exchange rate shock on average growth. Yet, adjustment
costs prevent the government from fully eliminating the shock, and therefore
the conclusions of Proposition 1 regarding the interactions between exchange
rate volatility and ￿nancial or technological development remain valid.
31This cost is meant to capture complementary reasons for interest rate smoothing, e.g
along the arguments put forward by Sack and Wieland (2000) or Woodford (2003).
27A.2 Productivity and risk-premium shocks
Here we introduce a productivity shock on top of the exchange rate shock,
and assume two-point distributions for both shocks. Under the assumption
that e ￿t+1("￿;"u) ￿ 1; e ￿t+1(￿"￿;"u) < 1, e ￿t+1("￿;￿"u) < 1, e ￿t+1(￿"￿;￿"u)
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The ￿rst order conditions give:

















In particular, we see that ￿1 is independent of "u, while ￿2 only depends
upon "￿ and "u.
Now consider what happens when ￿ or at increases. For su¢ ciently large
￿ or at; we have e ￿t+1(￿"￿;"u) = 1 and/or e ￿t("￿;￿"u) = 1, which in turn
leads to lower optimal values for ￿1 and ￿2:
28B Construction of the Real Exchange Rate
Measures
B.1 E⁄ective Real Exchange Rate
The empirical counterpart to the real exchange rate concept proposed in
the model is a trade-weighted e⁄ective exchange rate measure de￿ ated using
labor costs. We use the same time invariant trade weights as in Goldfajn and
Valdes (1999): trade shares with major trade partners in 1985 from United
Nation Trade Statistics 32. As reliable data on labor costs are available only
for a small subset of countries, we use the relative price level of consumption
from international comparison of prices in Penn World Tables 6.1 in order to









where i 2 [1;99] and j 2 [1;14] index the country and its trade partners, Pi
and Pj are the prices of the same basket of consumption goods in domestic
currency in country i and country j, Sij; the nominal exchange rate, i.e. the
number of units of currency i for a unit of currency j, and wij the weight of
country j in the trade exchange of country i:
An alternative measure of the e⁄ective real exchange rate is constructed
using monthly CPI data from International Finance Statistics and monthly
nominal exchange rate. As CPI is an index series normalized at 100 in 2000














i is the CPI index.
B.2 Real Exchange Rate Volatility.
The volatility of the real exchange rate used in the regression analysis is
computed in each ￿ve year interval as the annual standard deviation of the
32see Appendix B for the list of major trade partners.
29growth rate of the e⁄ective real exchange rate:33
￿i;t;t+5 = stdev[ln(RER
SH




In order to construct a measure of real exchange rate overvaluation, we fol-
low Dollar (1987). The equilibrium concept for the real exchange rate is
Purchasing Power Parity adjusted from di⁄erences in the relative price of
non tradeables to tradeables attributed to di⁄erences in factor endowments
(i.e. the ￿ Balassa-Samuelson￿e⁄ect). Following Dollar (1987), we perform
the following pooled OLS regression where income per capita and geograph-
ical dummies are used as proxies for factor endowments:
ln(RER
SH
i;t ) = ￿ + ￿tdt + ￿ ln(Yit) + ￿lac + ￿afri + "i;t (16)
where dt is a time dummy, Yit GDP per capita, lac and afri continental
dummies for Latin-American and African countries. Therefore, the real over-
valuation measure is de￿ned as:
ROV Ii;t = 100 ￿ [((RER
SH
i;t ) ￿ d RERSH
i;t )]
where d RERSH
i;t is obtained by taking the antilog of the predicted series in
regression (16).34
An alternative measure of Real Overvaluation is derived following Goldfajn-
Valdes (1999) as the log deviation of the CPI based measure of real exchange
rate, RERCPI
i from a stochastic trend constructed using a Hodrick-Prescott
￿lter with a smoothing parameter: ￿ = 108
33Using growth rates to control for trending behavior in real exchange rate is standard
in the literature (e.g. Hussain, Mody and Rogo⁄ (2005))






*** denotes 1% signi￿cance
30Appendix B: List of Countries
Full 99 Countries Sample
Sample of  83 Countries Used in 
the  Regression Analysis Major Trade Partner
Algeria x x
Argentina x x x







Brazil x x x








Congo, Dem. Rep. x x
Congo, Rep. x x
Costa Rica x x
Cote d'Ivoire x x
Denmark x x
Dominican Republic x x
Ecuador x x
Egypt, Arab Rep. x x
El Salvador x x
Ethiopia x
Finland x x
France x x x
Gabon x
Gambia, The x x











Iran, Islamic Rep. x x
Ireland x x
Israel x x
Italy x x x
Jamaica x xJapan x x x
Jordan x x
Kenya x x









Netherlands x x x















Saudi Arabia x x
Senegal x x
Sierra Leone x x
Singapore x x x
South Africa x x x
Spain x x x




Syrian Arab Republic x x
Thailand x x
Togo x x




United Kingdom x x x
United States x x x
Uruguay x x
Venezuela, RB x x
Zambia x x
Zimbabwe x xAppendix C: Definitions and Sources of Variables Used in Regression Analysis
Variable Definition and Construction Source
GDP per capita Ratio of total GDP to total population. GDP is in 1985 PPP-
adjusted US$. 
Authors' construction using Summers and 
Heston (1991) and The World Bank 
(2002).
GDP per capita growth  Log difference of real GDP per capita. Authors' construction using Summers and 
Heston (1991) and The World Bank 
(2002).
Initial GDP per capita Initial value of ratio of total GDP to total population. GDP is 
in 1985 PPP-adjusted US$. 
Authors' construction using Summers and 
Heston (1991) and The World Bank 
(2002).
Output per worker Real GDP  per worker. Summers and Heston (1991).
Output per worker growth Log difference of real output per worker. Authors' construction using Summers and 
Heston (1991).
Initial Output per worker Initial value of Real GDP Chain per worker. Authors' construction using Summers and 
Heston (1991).
Degree of exchange rate 
flexibility
See Section 3.1 Reinhart and Rogoff (2001).
Education Ratio of total secondary enrollment, regardless of age, to the 
population of the age group that officially corresponds to that 
level of education. 
World Development Network (2002) and 
The World Bank (2002).
Private Credit Ratio of domestic credit claims on private sector to GDP  Author’s calculations using data from IFS,
the publications of the Central Bank and
PWD. The method of calculations is based
on Beck, Demiguc-Kunt andLevine (1999).
Trade Openness Residual of a regression of the log of the ratio of exports and 
imports (in 1995 US$) to GDP (in 1995 US$), on the logs of 
area and population, and dummies for oil exporting and for 
landlocked countries.
Author’s calculations with data from 
World Development Network (2002) and 
The World Bank (2002).
Government Size Ratio of government consumption to GDP. The World Bank (2002).
CPI Consumer price index (2000 = 100) at the end of the year. Author’s calculations using data from IFS.
Inflation rate Annual % change in CPI. Author’s calculations using data from IFS.
Lack of Price Stability log(100+inflation rate).  Author’s calculations using data from IFS.
Real Effective Exchange 
Rate 
See Appendix A Author’s calculations using data from IFS 
and UN Trade Statistics
Real Effective Exchange 
Rate Volatility
See Appendix A Author’s calculations with data from IFS 
and UN Trade Statistics
Real Exchange Rate 
Overvaluation
See Appendix A Author’s calculations with data from IFS 
and UN Trade Statistics
Crisis dummy Number of years in which a country underwent a systemic
banking or a currency crisis, as a fraction of the number of
years in the corresponding period.
Author’s calculations using data from
Caprio and Klingebiel (1999), Kaminsky
and Reinhart (1998), and Gosh, Gulde and
Wolf (2000).
REGULATION INDEXES Each index measures the intensity of the regulatory system on
a scale from 0 to 1 (1 representing the heaviest regulation). In
order to be able to combine all components, Loayza, Oviedo
and Serven (2004) apply the following standarization formula
to each one of them:






= higher values of X indicate heavier regulation
Overall Regulation Average score of entry, financial market, labor, trade, fiscal
burden, contract enforcement and bankrupcy regulation
measures.
Loayza, Oviedo and Serven (2004).
Product Market Regulation Average score of entry, financial market, trade, contract
enforcement and bankrupcy regulation measures.
Loayza, Oviedo and Serven (2004).
Labor Regulation Combines the percentage of workers that belong to a union,
the minimun mandatory conditions and the degree of hiring
and firing flexibility granted.
Loayza, Oviedo and Serven (2004).
Regulation of Entry Combines the number of legal steps required to register a new 
business with an indicator of the overall legal burden of 
registration and willingness of the government to facilitate the 
process and intervene minimally.
Loayza, Oviedo and Serven (2004).
Bankrupcy Regulation Regulation measures the efficiency of bankrupcy process by
combining the time and cost of insolvency, the enforcement of
priority of claims, the extent to which the efficient outcome is
achieved , and the degree of court involvement in the process.
Loayza, Oviedo and Serven (2004).








=Table 1: Descriptive Statistics 
Panel A : Average Annual Volatility (%) of  Real 
Effective Exchange Rate and Selected Aggregate 
Variables*
Variable Full sample Sample without free falling years
Volatility of  Real  Effective Exchange Rate 18.01 15.45
Volatility of Real Per Capita Output Growth 4.55 3.78
Volatility of CPI inflation 16.35 7.24
Volatility of Term of Trade Growth 10.65 9.71
Volatility of Fiscal Expenditures over GDP 9.93 8.06
Volatility of Trade Weighted Comodity Price Change 7.59 7.53
* cross-sectional average of the standard deviation computed for each variable in each country over 1960-2000
Panel B : Average Monthly Volatility of  Real Effective 
Exchange Rate by Exchange Rate Regime*
regime full sample excluding outliers**
Fix 1.61 1.53
Peg 1.60 1.60
Managed Float 2.84 2.56
Float 2.59 2.59
Free Falling 7.35 5.38
*average by exchange rate regime of monthly volatility
monthly Volatility = standard deviation of change in RER computed over a year
**excluding the 1% upper tail of each distribution of monthly volatilityTable 2
 Growth effects of the flexibility of exchange rate regime: the role of financial development
Dependent Variable: Growth Rate of Output per Worker
Estimation: 2-step system GMM estimation with Windmeijer (2003) Small Sample Robust Correction and Time Effects




[2.1] [2.2] [2.3] [2.4] 
Degree of the Exchange Flexibility -0.191 -1.135 * -0.1442 -1.2266 **
(Reinhart and Rogoff Clasisification) 0.349 0.579 0.2880 0.5629
Financial Development 0.684 ** 0.185 0.655 ** 0.258
  (private domestic credit/GDP, in logs) 0.347 0.160 0.326 0.941
Initial Output per Worker -0.150 -0.117 -0.152 -0.126
(log( Initial Output per Worker)) 0.418 0.447 0.447 0.461
Flexibility * Financial Development 0.303 ** 0.336 **
0.146 0.159
Control Variables:
Education 1.493 ** 1.518 ** 1.481 ** 1.509 **
  (secondary enrollment, in logs) 0.630 0.676 0.574 0.605
Trade Openness 1.632 * 1.626 * 1.719 ** 1.407 *
  (structure-adjusted trade volume/GDP, in logs) 0.914 0.858 0.869 0.799
Government Burden -1.842 * -1.950 * -1.917 * -1.989 *
  (government consumption/GDP, in logs) 1.088 1.136 1.114 1.150
Lack of Price Stability -2.731 -2.767 -1.660 -2.470
  (inflation rate, in log [100+inf. rate]) 1.757 1.761 2.088 1.850
Crisis -1.826 * -1.741 *
( 0-1 dummy for banking or currency crisis) 1.054  1.075
Intercept 15.711 ** 17.418 ** 10.940 15.731 *
7.5131 8.509 9.4513 9.2799
No. Countries / No. Observations 79/497 79/497 79/497 79/497
SPECIFICATION TESTS (P-Values)
 (a) Sargan Test: 0.252 0.227 0.291 0.367
 (b) Serial Correlation :
       First-Order 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
       Second-Order 0.348 0.361 0.441 0.388
WALD TESTS (P-values)     
Ho :Exchange Rate Flexibility Total Effect  0.009 0.000
Ho :Financial Development  Total Effect =0 0.035 0.044
** means significant at 5% and * means significant at 10%
Source: Authors' estimations
THRESHOLD ANALYSIS
Growth enhancing effect of exchange rate flexibility:   





 Growth effects of  real  effective exchange rate volatility: the role of financial development
Dependent Variable: Growth Rate of Output per Worker
Estimation: 2-step system GMM estimation with Windmeijer (2003) Small Sample Robust Correction and Time Effects





[3.1] [3.2] [3.3] [3.4] 
Real Exchange Rate Volatility -0.637 ** -3.124 ** -0.554 ** -3.319 **
0.273 1.204 0.262 1.208
Financial Development 1.111 ** -0.650 0.987 ** -0.729
  (private domestic credit/GDP, in logs) 0.455 0.808 0.402 0.821
Initial Output per Worker -1.112 ** -0.530 -1.025 ** -0.828 **
(log( Initial Output per Worker)) 0.391 0.474 0.360 0.404
Exchange Rate Volatility * Financial Development 0.677 ** 0.706 **
0.262 0.277
Control Variables:
Education 1.807 ** 1.778 ** 1.976 ** 2.378 **
  (secondary enrollment, in logs) 0.532 0.694 0.465 0.585
Trade Openness
  (structure-adjusted trade volume/GDP, in logs) 1.053 * 1.115 ** 1.420 ** 1.579 *
.5722 .7693 .5693 0.9748
Government Burden -0.416 -0.928 -1.068 -0.871
  (government consumption/GDP, in logs) 1.153 1.070 1.104 1.372
Lack of Price Stability -2.569 * -1.961 -1.872 * -1.172
  (inflation rate, in log [100+inf. rate]) 1.487 1.237 1.117 1.379
Crisis -2.250 ** -2.857 **
(banking or currency crisis) 0.878 1.374
Intercept 18.325 ** 13.346 ** 15.689 ** 14.556 **
7.043 5.072 5.848 6.971
No. Countries / No. Observations 83/548 83/548 83/548 83/548
SPECIFICATION TESTS (P-Values)
 (a) Sargan Test: 0.461 0.241 0.663 0.187
 (b) Serial Correlation :
       First-Order 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
       Second-Order 0.462 0.383 0.572 0.516
WALD TESTS (P-values)
Ho :Exchange Rate Flexibility Total Effect=0    0.000 0.000
Ho :Financial Development  Total Effect =0 0.032 0.012
** means significant at 5% and * means significant at 10%
Source: Authors' estimations
THRESHOLD ANALYSIS
Growth enhancing effect of exchange rate flexibility if:





Growth effects of effective exchange rate real overvaluation: the role of financial development
Dependent Variable: Growth Rate of Output per Worker
Estimation: 2-step system GMM estimation with Windmeijer (2003) Small Sample Robust Correction and Time Effects




[4.1] [4.2] [4.3] [4.4] 
Degree of the Real Exchange Rate Overvaluation  -0.9949 ** -1.1618 * -1.1760 ** -1.1787 **
(log deviation from equilibrium exchange rate) 0.5038 0.7108 0.5339 0.6590
Financial Development 0.6361 * -0.1007 0.5948 * -0.0404
  (private domestic credit/GDP, in logs) 0.3446 2.5091 0.3296 2.1631
Initial Output per Worker -0.0384 -0.3604 -0.0574 -0.3545
(log( Initial Output per Worker)) 0.3815 0.5308 0.3690 0.5181
Real overvaluation * Financial Development 0.2053 ** 0.1629 **
0.0769 0.0818
Control Variables:
Education 1.1854 * 1.5315 ** 1.2454 ** 1.6449 **
  (secondary enrollment, in logs) 0.6131 0.7724 0.5952 0.8002
Trade Openness 1.3277 ** 1.6194 ** 1.4615 * 1.6297 **
  (structure-adjusted trade volume/GDP, in logs) 0.6264 0.6876 0.8116 0.7773
Government Burden -1.4566 * -2.1841 -1.3286 -1.9306
  (government consumption/GDP, in logs) 0.8274 1.3576 0.8749 1.4829
Lack of Price Stability -4.5052 ** -3.8190 ** -3.8574 ** -3.7077 **
  (inflation rate, in log [100+inf. rate]) 1.0087 1.1602 0.9345 0.8811
Crisis -1.2813 -2.0817
(banking or currency crisis) 1.3257 1.2843
Intercept 27.6120 ** 27.5510 ** 25.1475 ** 26.8815 **
5.7204 8.7510 5.5564 7.6262
No. Countries / No. Observations 83/548 83/548 83/548 83/548
SPECIFICATION TESTS (P-Values)
 (a) Sargan Test: 0.413 0.224 0.279 0.220
 (b) Serial Correlation :
       First-Order 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
       Second-Order 0.268 0.278 0.359 0.271
WALD TESTS (P-values)
Ho :Exchange Rate Flexibility Total Effect=0  0.000 0.000
Ho :Financial Development  Total Effect =0 0.037 0.028
** means significant at 5% and * means significant at 10%
Source: Authors' estimations
THRESHOLD ANALYSIS
Growth enhancing effect overvaluation:  





Dependent Variable: Growth Rate of Output per Worker
Estimation: 2-step system GMM estimation with Windmeijer (2003) Small Sample Robust Correction and Time Effects




[5.1] [5.2]   [5.3]
Degree of the Exchange Flexibility -4.845 **
(Reinhart and Rogoff Clasisification) 2.287
Real Exchange Rate Volatility -3.361 *
1.797
Degree of the Real Exchange Rate Overvaluation  -3.886 **
(log deviation from equilibrium exchange rate) 1.308
Financial Development 0.640 ** 1.180 ** 0.593 *
  (private domestic credit/GDP, in logs) 0.315 0.504 0.305
Initial Output per Worker -1.474 ** -1.830 ** -3.074
(log( Initial Output per Worker)) 0.641 0.595 2.126
Flexibility*Initial Ouput Per Worker 0.568 **
  0.265
Exchange Rate Volatility*Initial Ouput Per Worker 0.358 **
0.173
Real overvaluation*Initial Ouput Per Worker 0.401 **
0.180
Control Variables:
Education 1.505 ** 2.470 ** 1.518 **
  (secondary enrollment, in logs) 0.703 0.567 0.678
Trade Openness 1.003 1.137 1.212 *
  (structure-adjusted trade volume/GDP, in logs) 0.718 1.1022 0.706
Government Burden -0.952 -0.795 -1.327
  (government consumption/GDP, in logs) 1.419 1.261 0.988
Lack of Price Stability -4.006 ** -2.034 -3.801 **
  (inflation rate, in log [100+inf. rate]) 0.981 1.347 0.945
Crisis -1.889 * -2.623 ** -1.908 *
( 0-1 dummy for banking or currency crisis) 1.064 1.184 1.050
Intercept 30.217 ** 20.266 ** 46.119 **
6.837 7.668 16.205
No. Countries / No. Observations 79/497 83/548 83/548
SPECIFICATION TESTS (P-Values)
 (a) Sargan Test: 0.595 0.180 0.423
 (b) Serial Correlation :
       First-Order 0.000 0.000 0.000
       Second-Order 0.364 0.417 0.312
WALD TESTS (P-values)
Ho :Exchange Rate Measure Total Effect=0    0.000 0.017 0.000
Ho :Initial Output Total Effect =0 0.014 0.000 0.000
** means significant at 5% and * means significant at 10%
Source: Authors' estimations
THRESHOLD ANALYSIS
Growth enhancing effect of each exchange rate measure:  
Ouput Per Worker  greater than (1995 US$) 5099 12063.391 16047
s.e. 2321 5329 6477
 Growth effects of  the flexibility of  exchange rate regime, real exchange rate volatility and  real 




Dependent Variable: Growth Rate of Output per Worker
Estimation: 2-step system GMM estimation with Windmeijer (2003) Small Sample Robust Correction and Time Effects
(Standard errors are presented below the corresponding coefficient)
Period: 1961-2000
Unit of observation: Non-overlapping 5-year averages
Estimation Technique: System GMM
[6.1] [6.2]   [6.3]
Term of Trade Growth 0.083 * 0.327 * 0.385 **
(Growth Rate of Term of Trade Index) 0.049 0.169 0.173
Degree of the Exchange Flexibility -0.126
(Reinhart and Rogoff classification) 0.350
Financial Development 0.572 * 0.783 * 0.285  
  (private domestic credit/GDP, in logs) 0.322 0.395 0.192
Initial Output per Worker -0.887 * -0.644 * -0.702
(log( Initial Output per Worker)) 0.531 0.381 0.465
Flexibility*Term of Trade Growth -0.107 ** -0.136 **
  0.044 0.062
Flexibility*Financial Development 0.357 **
0.159
Control Variables:
Education 2.045 ** 2.301 ** 2.301 **
  (secondary enrollment, in logs) 0.542 0.467 0.571
Trade Openness 0.980 1.493   1.385 *
  (structure-adjusted trade volume/GDP, in logs) 0.746 1.074 0.706
Government Burden -1.033 -0.762 -0.707
  (government consumption/GDP, in logs) 0.738 1.191 0.982
Lack of Price Stability -3.349 ** -4.354 ** -3.560 **
  (inflation rate, in log [100+inf. rate]) 1.189 1.784 1.432
Crisis -2.043 * -2.104 *     *
( 0-1 dummy for banking or currency crisis) 1.054 1.065 1.050
.
Intercept 20.222 ** 32.117 ** 35.334 **
4.044 10.706 9.815
No. Countries / No. Observations 83/548 83/548 79/494
SPECIFICATION TESTS (P-Values)
 (a) Sargan Test: 0.130 0.420 0.680
 (b) Serial Correlation :
       First-Order 0.000 0.000 0.000
       Second-Order 0.400 0.450 0.450
** means significant at 5% and * means significant at 10%
Source: Authors' estimations  
 Growth effects of  the flexibility of exchange rate regime and term of trade growthTable 7: Exchange Rate Regime, Regulation and Productivity Growth
Estimation: 2-step system GMM estimation with Windmeijer (2003) Small Sample Robust Correction
(Standard errors are presented below the corresponding coefficient)
 
Period: 1961-2000
Unit of observation: Non-overlapping 5-year averages
Estimation Technique: System GMM
[7.1] [7.2] [7.3] [7.4] [7.5]
Financial Development 1.113 * 1.046 ** 1.141 ** 0.942 0.863 *
  (private domestic credit/GDP, in logs) 0.594 0.441 0.562 0.571 0.511
Initial Output per Worker -0.640 -0.461 -0.749 * -0.556 -1.090 *
(log( Initial Output per Worker)) 0.515 0.374 0.448 0.651 0.622
Degree of Exchange Rate Flexibility (fld) 0.966 0.426 0.230 0.134 0.838
[Reinhart and Rogoff Clasisification) 0.930 0.576 0.815 0.823 0.512




fld*Product Regulation -1.577 **
0.668






Education 1.033 * 1.294 ** 1.299 ** 1.292 * 1.916 *
  (secondary enrollment, in logs) 0.524 0.528 0.514 0.672 0.988
Trade Openness 0.824 1.217 1.081 1.088 0.363
  (structure-adjusted trade volume/GDP, in logs) 0.990 0.957 0.935 1.052 0.904
Government Burden -0.855 -1.071 -0.916 -1.842 0.083
  (government consumption/GDP, in logs) 0.973 0.980 0.890 1.314 0.951
Lack of Price Stability -2.846 * -3.354 ** -2.255 -2.598 -4.257 **
  (inflation rate, in log [100+inf. rate]) 1.637 1.380 1.520 1.742 1.598
Intercept 16.349 ** 3.168 16.658 ** 14.618 * 19.578 **
7.788 6.133 7.415 8.753 8.065
No. Countries / No. Observations 72/546 70/530 72/546 72/546 61/460
SPECIFICATION TESTS (P-Values)
 (a) Sargan Test: 0.44 0.45 0.52 0.47 0.67
 (b) Serial Correlation :
       First-Order 0 0 0 0 0
       Second-Order 0.335 0.389 0.233 0.292 0.331
** means significant at 5% and * means significant at 10%
Source: Authors' estimations
 